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BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS-ORDINARY COURSE OF
BUSINESS EXCEPTION REQUIRES OBJECTIVE PROOF OF INDUSTRY
STANDARDS. JONES V. UNITED SAVINGS & LOAN Ass'N (IN RE U.S.A.
INNS, INC.), 9 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Jones v. United Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns,
Inc.),1 ("In re U.S.A. Inns") the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of what elements a creditor
must satisfy to assert the ordinary course of business defense 2 in
an action to avoid a preferential transfer.3 After analyzing the
Congressional intent and case law, the Eighth Circuit held that 11
U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988) requires three specific elements to be met.4
The first element requires that the transfer be made in payment of
a debt that was incurred in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and creditor.' The second element
requires that the transfer be made in the ordinary course of business
of the parties. 6 The third element requires that the transfer be made
according to ordinary business terms. 7 Importantly, the Eighth Circuit
held that the third element requires an objective showing that the
transfer was made according to ordinary business terms8 and discussed
what evidence is sufficient to meet this third element. 9
Under the facts in'In re U.S.A. Inns, the Eighth Circuit found
that the defendant had met its burden of proving all three elements
1. 9 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993).
2. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.10 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1995). The ordinary course of business defense can be asserted by creditors to the
extent that preferential payments they received were made in the ordinary course
of dealings between the parties and according to ordinary business terms. Id. The
elements of the ordinary course of business exception are found at 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(2)(A)-(C) (1988). See infra note 32.
3. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 682; see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
547.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995). Generally, a preferential transfer
is made when an insolvent debtor transfers property of the estate to an unsecured
creditor within a certain period of time before the bankruptcy petition is filed and
the transfer of property enables that creditor to receive more than the creditor
would have received in a distribution under a chapter 7 case. Id. The elements of
a preferential transfer are found at 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). See infra note 30.
4. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 684-85.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A) (1988).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1988).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C) (1988).
8. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 685.
9. Id.
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of the ordinary course of business exception and held that the
defendant successfully asserted this defense to the trustee's action
to recover the preferential transfers. 0 This casenote presents a sum-
mary of the facts presented in In re U.S.A. Inns, a history of the
ordinary course of business exception, and a discussion of the rea-
soning and significance of the Eighth Circuit's opinion.
II. FACTS
On July 31, 1985, Eureka Motel ("Eureka") signed a promissory
note in favor of United Savings & Loan Association ("United Sav-
ings") in the sum of $2.7 million." To secure the repayment of the
indebtedness, Eureka granted United Savings a first lien on the
premises known as the Eureka Motel, which was located in Eureka
Springs, Arkansas. 2 As additional collateral, Eureka gave United
Savings a security interest in all the furniture, fixtures, equipment,
and inventory of the Eureka Motel. '3
On August 10, 1988, Eureka sold the Eureka Motel to U.S.A.
Inns of Eureka Springs, Arkansas, Inc. ("U.S.A. Inns").14 U.S.A.
Inns entered into an agreement with Eureka to assume Eureka's
obligations under the original promissory note; however, United
Savings was unaware that Eureka had sold the Eureka Motel to
U.S.A. Inns. 5 Once United Savings became aware of the sale, it
"reluctant[ly]" agreed to U.S.A. Inns' assumption of Eureka's prom-
issory note.
16
Pursuant to the terms of the promissory note, U.S.A. Inns was
to pay monthly installments to United Savings in the amount of
$27,940.00, payable on the 30th day of each month. 7 These monthly
payments were to continue until July 29, 1992, when the entire
unpaid principal balance became due. 8 U.S.A. Inns made thirty-
one payments to United Savings totalling $192,008.34.' 9
10. Id.
11. Jones v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns, Inc.), 151 B.R.





16. Jones v. United Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns, Inc.), 151 B.R.
486, 489 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992), rev'd, 151 B.R. 492 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 9
F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Jones 1].
17. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 681.
18. Jones I, 151 B.R. at 488.
19. Id. at 489. U.S.A. Inns made the following payments to United Savings:
[Vol. 17:817
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On October 4, 1989, United Savings filed a foreclosure action
against U.S.A. Inns, 20 and on October 10, 1989, U.S.A. Inns filed
a petition for relief under the provisions of Chapter 1121 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. 22 On the date the petition was filed,
U.S.A. Inns owed United Savings $2,815,037.65 and the collateral
securing its debt had a fair market value of $2,620,000.00.23 On
November 24, 1989, U.S.A. Inns, as debtor-in-possession, filed an
adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court to recover preferential

































































20. Jones H, 151 B.R. at 494.
21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
22. Jones H, 151 B.R. at 494.
23. Jones v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns, Inc.), 9 F.3d 680,
681 (8th Cir. 1993).
24. Section 1107(a) gives a debtor-in-possession "all the rights . . . and powers,
. of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
Section 1106 provides that the trustee shall perform the duties of a trustee specified
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day period before the bankruptcy petition was filed. 25 On April 10,
1990, the case was converted to a case under Chapter 726 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. 27 Claude R. Jones was appointed
trustee28 of the debtor's estate and was substituted as the party
plaintiff in the adversary proceeding. 29
During the trial held in the bankruptcy court, the trustee and
United Savings stipulated that the payments made from July 14,
1989, through September 1, 1989, totaled $63,000.00, and met the
requisite elements of section 54730 to constitute preferential transfers;3
however, United Savings asserted that the payments fell within the
provisions of section 547(c)(2), 32 which excepts payments made in
in 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (1988). Section 704 provides that the
trustee shall recover property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). Section 547
gives the trustee the power to recover preferential transfers made within 90 days
of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed when the requirements of 11 U.S.C.
§ 547 (1988) are met. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). See infra note 30.
25. Jones I, 151 B.R. at 488.
26. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
27. Jones 1, 151 B.R. at 488.
28. Section 701(a)(1) provides for the prompt appointment of a trustee after
entry of the order of relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l) (1988). Section 704 sets out the general duties of the trustee.
11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
29. Jones 1, 151 B.R. at 488.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider;
and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
Id.
31. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d 681 n.1, 681-82.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(C) (1988). Section 547(c)(2) provides that the
trustee cannot avoid a transfer "to the extent that such transfer was-(A) in
payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; (B) made in the ordinary. course
of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and (C) made
according to ordinary business terms[.]" Id.
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the ordinary course of business from the trustee's ability to recover
preferences-"
United Savings presented as evidence the testimony of J.C.
Benage, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
United Savings.14 Although U.S.A. Inns was obligated to pay United
Savings $27,000 per month, Mr. Benage testified that U.S.A. Inns
never once paid a $27,000 monthly payment." Mr. Benage testified
that it was customary in the savings and loan industry for an
institution to continue working with a delinquent customer as long
as the customer makes payments in some amount on the indebt-
edness.3 6 Mr. Benage also testified that the Office of Thrift Super-
vision required United Savings to conform with industry-wide standards
in dealing with its delinquent customers.3 7 The relationship between
United Savings and U.S.A. Inns was described by Mr. Benage to
be "in accordance with ordinary business terms in the savings and
loan industry for this type of real estate trouble[d] loan."3 8 Mr.
Benage also testified that "probably eight to ten percent" of United
Saving's customers made payments in a delinquent manner similar
to U.S.A. Inns.3 9
The bankruptcy court held that United Savings met its burden
4
0
of proving the first two elements4' of the ordinary course of business
exception. 42 However, the bankruptcy court held that United Savings
failed to meet its burden as to the third element, 43 which required
an objective determination that the transfers were made according
to ordinary business terms.4 4 The bankruptcy court found that al-
though United Savings introduced evidence of the savings and loan
33. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 682.
34. Id. at 685.
35. Jones I, 151 B.R. at 490.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Jones v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns, Inc.), 9 F.3d 680,
685 (8th Cir. 1993).
39. Jones I, 151 B.R. at 491.
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988). The trustee has the burden of proving the
avoidability of a transfer under section 547(b), and the party against whom recovery
is sought has the burden of proving nonavoidability under section 547(c). Id.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A) and (B) (1988). The first element is that the debtor
incurred the debt "in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A) (1988). The second element
is that the transfer was "made in ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1988).
42. Jones I, 151 B.R. at 490-92.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C) (1988). The third element is that the transfer was
"made according to ordinary business terms." Id.
44. Jones 1, 151 B.R. at 490-92.
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industry's standards in dealing with delinquent customers, it failed
to introduce any evidence regarding the "ordinary business terms"
of the industry in general. 45 The bankruptcy court entered judgment
against United Savings in the amount of $63,000, which represented
the amount of transfers the bankruptcy court found to be avoidable
as preferences pursuant to section 547(b).46
United Savings appealed the bankruptcy court's judgment to
the United States District Court4 7 for the Western District of Ar-
kansas/ s The district court interpreted the Eighth Circuit's analysis
in Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking (In re Transportation Systems
International, Inc.),49 an earlier Eighth Circuit case, to determine
that U.S.A. Inns' payments to United Savings were made in the
ordinary course of business.50 Two issues were considered by the
district court: whether the party asserting the ordinary course of
business exception must introduce evidence to support the third
element of the defense and whether the evidence introduced by United
Savings was sufficient to meet its burden of proof that the transfers
it received from U.S.A. Inns were made according to ordinary
business terms."
In regard to the first issue, the district court stated that the
Eighth Circuit has basically "ignored the distinction" between the
second and third element.12 In interpreting Lovett, the district court
concluded that evidence supporting a finding that the payments were
made in the ordinary course of business dealings between the debtor
and creditor will satisfy both the second and third elements. 3 The
district court also quoted language from Lovett stating, "because
the manner, form, and timing of these payments were consistent
with the practice both parties followed previously," the payments
were made according to ordinary business terms.14 The district court
45. Id. at 492.
46. Id.
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988). The district court has jurisdiction to hear
appeals of final judgments of the bankruptcy court. Id.
48. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at. 682.
49. 931 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1991). The Lovett case involved a preferential transfer
found to be protected by the ordinary course of business exception. The Lovett
case is discussed in detail in part III.G infra.
50. Jones II, 151 B.R. at 497-501.
51. Id. at 493.
52. Id. at 498.
53. Id. The district court, in interpreting Lovett, stated that the Eighth Circuit
"conclud[ed] that both subsections were satisfied so long as the . . . payments were
consistent with the course of dealings between the debtor and creditor." Id.
54. Id. at 499-500.
[Vol. 17:817
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interpreted this language, together with other language in Lovett to
mean that the Eighth Circuit did not require specific evidence of
industry standards to meet the third element-according to ordinary
business terms."
In an alternative ruling, the district court reviewed the bank-
ruptcy court's factual finding as if the third element did require
evidence of ordinary business terms and found that the bankruptcy
court's factual finding that United Savings did not meet its burden
of proof was clearly erroneous.16 The district court compared the
testimony of Mr. Benage regarding the savings and loan industry's
practices in dealing with delinquent accounts with the testimony
offered by the creditor in Lovett. 7 The bankruptcy court had found
that although United Savings introduced testimony of how the savings
and loan industry handled other delinquent accounts, it did not
offer testimony regarding the industry standards in general." The
district court, relying on the analysis in Lovett, held that the evidence
presented by United Savings regarding the savings and loan industry's
practices in dealing with other delinquent accounts was sufficient to
carry its burden of proof for the third element.5 9
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Preferential Transfer Section and Its Purposes
Section 547(b) provides that a trustee may avoid a transfer made
on or within ninety days before a bankruptcy petition is filed when
certain requirements are met.6 By using these avoiding powers, the
55. Id. The district court described the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Lovett as
follows: "While the [Eighth Circuit] stated that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain 'whatever burden St. Johnsbury may have had on this issue,' the [Eighth
Circuit] did not hold that subsection (c)(2)(C) requires a 'comparison between the
payment record of a particular debtor and the general practices in the industry
regarding the time of payment."' Id. at 500. Other courts have concurred with
the district court's interpretation of Lovett and have also interpreted Lovett to
suggest that the third element is met as long as the payments were consistent with
the previous transactions between the parties. See, e.g., Official Plan Comm. v.
Zamzow Mfg. Co. (In re Valley Steel Prods. Co.), 166 B.R. 1001, 1004 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1993) (quoting language from Lovett suggesting the third element may
not require proof of industry standards); White v. Bradford (In re Tax Reduction
Inst.), 148 B.R. 63, 75 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (interpreting Lovett to suggest that
prior practices between the parties can establish ordinary business terms).
56. Jones II, 151 B.R. at 500-01.
57. Id.
58. Jones I, 151 B.R. at 492.
59. Jones H, 151 B.R. at 492.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). See supra note 30.
19951
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trustee can recover certain payments made by the debtor to creditors
within the ninety days before the bankruptcy petition was filed and
redistribute these payments equally among all the unsecured creditors.
6'
Avoiding such preferential transfers meets the first and most important
purpose of the preferential transfer section-to create equality of
distribution among the creditors of the debtor. 62 The second purpose
of the preferential transfer section is to deter the "'race of diligence'
of creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy.
63
A creditor can be protected from the trustee's avoiding powers
if the creditor qualifies under one of the four exceptions provided
under section 547(c).6 The first exception is for transfers made in
a contemporaneous exchange for new value, 65 the second is for
transfers made in the ordinary course of business, 66 the third is to
the extent the transfer created a security interest in property acquired
by the debtor, 67 and the fourth exception is for transfers made in
exchange for new value to the creditor. 68 This note focuses on the
61. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). However, all unencumbered assets of the estate
are subject to payment of postpetition administrative claims before distribution to
prepetition unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988).
62. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138.
63. Id.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988).
65. Section 547(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit
such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value
given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988).
66. See supra note 32 for text of 1 I US.C. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(C) (1988).
67. Section 547(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer- . .
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that
contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such
agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property;
and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property;
and
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receives
possession of such property[.]
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1988).
68. Section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
BANKRUPTCY
second exception known as the "ordinary course of business
exception."
B. History of the Ordinary Course of Business Exception
69
A party from whom a trustee is seeking recovery of a preferential
transfer may assert, as an affirmative defense, that the transfer was
made in the ordinary course of business as described by section
547(c)(2). 70 Without the ordinary course of business exception,
payments made by the debtor for current utility expenses or payments
regularly made on open accounts sometimes fall under the provisions
of the preference section. 71 These types of payments were not intended
to be avoided under the preference section. 72 By allowing normal,
routine business transfers to be excepted from the trustee's avoidance
powers, the ordinary course of business exception attempts to meet
the goal of the preference section to deter payments made in response
to unusual actions "by either the debtor or his creditors during the
debtor's slide into bankruptcy.
' 73
Prior to the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the
ordinary course of business exception provided that the transfer
would not be protected if the transfer was made more than forty-
five days after the debt was incurred. 74 Courts disagreed about how
to determine when the debt was incurred. 75 The result of the forty-
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer- ....
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor[.]
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
69. For an interesting account of the early origins of the ordinary course of
business exception from English jurisprudence in the 1500s, see generally David A.
Ontko, Comment, Ordinary Business Terms Must Not Be Ignored: The Forgotten
But Critical Role of § 547(c)(2)(C) in the Ordinary Course of Business Exception
to the Preference Rules, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 429, 431-32 (1989).
70. See supra note 32.
71. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 168 (1992)
(discussing theoretical purposes of the ordinary course of business exception).
72. Id.
73. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 373 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1978), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1988).
75. See, e.g., Sandoz v. Fred Wilson Drilling Co. (In re Emerald Oil Co.), 695
F.2d 833, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that debt is incurred when the debtor
becomes obligated to pay the debt, not when invoiced); Iowa Premium Serv. Co.
v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Iowa Premium Serv. Co.), 695 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (8th
Cir. 1982) (holding that interest debt incurred on date interest accrued); Campbell
19951
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five day rule was that many payments in fact made in the ordinary
course of business were set aside as preferential transfers. For instance,
a debtor who purchased coffee on credit, incurred the debt on the
date the coffee was shipped because that is the date the debtor
became obligated to pay for the goods.76 The agreement between
the parties specified that payment was not due until forty-five days
after the coffee was weighed. 71 Under the forty-five day rule, this
transaction was not protected as ordinary course of business even
though it clearly was ordinary course of business. 78 Therefore,
sometimes the result of the forty-five day rule was that many trade
creditors were not able to benefit from the ordinary course of business
exception because they would receive payments outside a forty-five
day cycle, even though the transaction was made in the ordinary
course of business.
79
Congress amended section 547(c)(2) in 1984 and eliminated the
forty-five day provision completely. 0 Apparently, this provision was
eliminated due in part to lobbying efforts by issuers of commercial
paper with maturity dates outside the forty-five day period.8 The
result of the amendment was to greatly enlarge the scope of the
ordinary course of business exception and to allow creditors to defend
actions by trustees to avoid preferential transfers. After the 1984
amendments, creditors with business cycles greater than forty-five
v. Cannington (In re Economy Milling Co.), 37 B.R. 914, 921 (D.S.C. 1983)
(holding that a debt on an option contract is incurred on the date the option
ended); Keydata Corp. v. Boston Edison Co. (In re Keydata Corp.), 37 B.R. 324,
328 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (holding that debt for utility services was incurred on
the date the utility meter was read).
76. Nordberg v. Wilcafe, Inc. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 51 B.R. 736,
738-39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
77. Id. at 738.
78. Id. at 739.
79. See Energy Coop., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. (In re Energy Coop., Inc.), 80
B.R. 921, 924 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (discussing reasons Congress later amended
45-day rule).
80. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, § 462, 98 Stat. 333, 377-78.
81. The Bankruptcy Court Reform-Conference Report reflects a colloquy between
Senator DeConcini of Arizona and Senator Dole of Kansas as follows:
Mr. DeConcini. Am I correct that the elimination of the 45-day restriction
in subsection (c)(2) of section 547 will relieve buyers of commercial paper
with maturities in excess of 45 days of the concern that repayments of
such paper at maturity might be considered as preferential transfers?
Mr. Dole. That is correct, assuming that the 'ordinary course of business
or financial affairs' and 'ordinary business terms' requirements are met.
130 Cong. Rec. 20080, 20091 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (Analysis of Proposed
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978).
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days were no longer denied the benefits of the ordinary course of
business exception.
C. Case Law Analysis of the Ordinary Course of Business
Exception
Section 547(c)(2) has remained the same since the 1984
amendments and has been the subject of much litigation.8 2 Courts
determining whether a preferential transfer falls within the ordinary
course of business exception have generally focused on the previous
conduct of the parties.8" The transfer must be found to be consistent
and ordinary between the particular parties involved in the preference
action.84 The exception has been found not to apply in cases where
courts find some type of coercive action on the part of the creditor.85
The present version of section 547(c)(2) contains three subsections.8 6
The first subsection provides that the transfer must be made "in
payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course




The second subsection provides that the transfer must be "made in
the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor
and the transferee. ' 88 The third subsection provides that the transfer
must be "made according to ordinary business terms." 8 9 The party
82. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 83 and 85.
83. See, e.g., Waldschmidt v, Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.), 872 F.2d
739, 743 (6th Cir. 1989) (determining ordinary course of business exception by
analyzing the business practices between the particular parties involved); Florida
Steel Corp. v. Stober (In re Industrial Supply Corp.), 127 B.R. 62, 64-65 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (analyzing the business practices between the particular parties, not the
general practices of the industry, to determine ordinary course of business), aff'd,
961 F.2d 1582 (lth Cir. 1992); In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 B.R. 269,
273 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (holding that the creditor must prove that the transfer
was consistent with other transactions between the parties involved to establish
ordinary course of business).
84. See, e.g., cases cited in note 83.
85. See, e.g., Xtra, Inc. v. Seawinds Ltd. (In re Seawinds Ltd.), 888 F.2d 640,
641 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (holding that where creditor demanded immediate payment
and raised rates on other purchases, transfers were not in ordinary course of
business); Tolz v. Signal Capital Corp. (In re Mastercraft Graphics, Inc.), 157 B.R.
914, 920-21 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that payments made pursuant to a
settlement agreement of a civil action not ordinary course of business), aff'd, No.
94-6125-CIV (S.D. Fla. 1995); Millwork, Inc. v. Heigel Lumber & Hardware (In
re Mid-South Cabinet & Millwork, Inc.), 125 B.R. 16, 18-19 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1990) (holding that payments made in response to creditor's threat to terminate
credit were not made in ordinary course of business).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(C) (1988).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A) (1988).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1988).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C) (1988).
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asserting the ordinary course of business defense has the burden of
proving the nonavoidability of the transfer.90
The courts have disagreed about whether a party asserting the
ordinary course of business defense must present evidence to support
each of the three elements of section 547(c)(2) or whether evidence
supporting the first and second elements is sufficient to meet the
requirements of all three.9 1 The different views will be discussed in
detail below.
D. Only Necessary to Prove the First Two Elements of the
Ordinary Course of Business Exception
In determining whether the creditor has met its burden of proving
that a transfer was made in the ordinary course of business, some
courts have determined that the "ordinary business terms" requirement
of the third element is met if the transfer was ordinary between the
parties involved in the litigation.9 2 The basis for this view appears
to be that as long as the transfer was ordinary between the parties
and not the result of some coercive action on the part of the creditor,
the transfer should be left undisturbed. 93 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed this view in J.P. Fyfe,
Inc. v. Bradco Supply Corp. 94 and stated that it did not disagree
with the lower court's approach of determining compliance with the
"ordinary business terms" by analyzing the business terms between
the parties instead of focusing on business terms used by parties in
the industry. 9 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
90. 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988). See supra note 40.
91. Compare J.P. Fyfe, Inc. v. Bradco Supply Corp., 891 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir.
1989) and Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1565
(11th Cir. 1986) (both suggesting only evidence of first two elements required);
with In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1993) and
Logan v. Basic Distribution Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239,
243 (6th Cir. 1992) (both requiring specific evidence for all three elements). See
generally Hertzberg v. Amercian Elec. Contractors (In re Steel Improvement Co.),
79 B.R. 681, 683-85 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (discussing the majority and minority
approaches in interpreting ordinary course of business elements); "Ordinary Business
Terms" is Affected by Length of Parties' Relationship, Bankruptcy Counselor,
April 11, 1994, at 79 (discussing different views of courts considering the third
element of the ordinary course of business defense).
92. See, e.g., Fyfe, 891 F.2d at 71; In re Craig Oil Co., 785 F.2d at 1565.
93. See In re Craig Oil Co., 785 F.2d at 1566.
94. 891 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1989).
95. Id. at 71. The court stated: "There are different views among the courts
as to whether the test of what constitutes 'ordinary business terms' is determined
by looking to the relevant industry standards or to the terms and practices normally
employed by the debtor and creditor. The district court here apparently looked to
'the course of business between the parties' with which we do not disagree." Id.
at 71 n.5 (citation omitted).
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Eleventh Circuit in Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil
Co.), 96 stated that the "events surrounding" the transfers from the
debtor to the creditor were the relevant factors to determine whether
the second and third elements had been met. 97 Many bankruptcy
courts have also followed this view. 98
E. Must Introduce Evidence of All Three Elements of the
Ordinary Course of Business Exception
Some courts adopt the view that there are three distinct elements
for the creditor to prove, including the "ordinary business terms"
requirement. 99 Evidence of ordinary business terms requirement is
satisfied by analyzing the relevant industry standards.'0° The basis
for this view is that the statute is written in the conjunctive and,
therefore, separate evidence must be required to satisfy the third
element or the third subsection of the statute would be a "nullity"
or "superfluous." 0 For example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in In re WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Department
of Public Welfare, 0 2 reasoned that since the conjunction "and" is
used in the statute, all three elements must be met by the creditor. 03
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit discussed
the third element in detail when analyzing whether the third
requirement had been met in In re Tolona Pizza Products Corp. °0
In Tolona Pizza, the court reasoned that if it did not require the
96. 785 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 1565. "[Tlhe only issue ... on appeal is whether the bankruptcy
court erroneously concluded that [the creditor] failed to prove the two remaining
requirements: that the payments were made in the ordinary course of business
between [the debtor] and [the creditor] and were made according to their ordinary
business terms. Resolution of these issues turns on the specific events surrounding
[the debtor's] payments to [the creditor]." Id.
98. See, e.g., Equipment Co. of Am. v. Production Supply Co. (In re Equipment
Co. of Am.), 135 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); Tolz v. Sunspa/Skinflicks
(In re Sunup/Sundown, Inc.), 66 B.R. 1021, 1022-23 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986);
Newton v. Ed's Supply Co. (In re White), 58 B.R. 266, 270 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1986).
99. See, e.g., Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1032-33; Logan, 957 F.2d at 243; In re
WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1011 (1st Cir.
1988).
100. See Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1033. In Tolona Pizza, the Seventh Circuit
stated that the phrase 'ordinary business terms' refers to the range of terms that
encompasses the practices in which firms similar in some general way to the creditor
in question engage." Id.
101. See Logan, 957 F.2d at 243.
102. 840 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1988).
103. In re WJM, 840 F.2d at 1011.
104. 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993).
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third element to be met, the result would be to "cut out and throw
away" a portion of the statute's requirements. 15
In Logan v. Basic Distribution Corp. (In re Fred Hawes
Organization, Inc.),'°6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found that Congress must have intended to require
the creditor to prove all three elements or it would have used the
disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and" when it drafted
the statute.0 7 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit,
as well as many bankruptcy courts, have followed the view that all
three elements must be met.1
08
F. The Evidence Necessary to Prove the Transfer was Made
According to Ordinary Business Terms
Congress did not define what is meant by "ordinary business
terms" and courts requiring evidence of the third element do not
always agree on what evidence is necessary to prove this element.
Judge Posner in Tolona Pizza recognized one of the issues presented
by the language of subsection (C) by asking: "[D]oes it refer to
what is 'ordinary' between this debtor and this creditor, or what is
ordinary in the market or industry in which they operate?" 9 The
Tolona Pizza court determined that in order for the third element
to have some function it must be interpreted to require the creditor
to prove that the payment was made consistent with business terms
recognized as ordinary within the industry, but added that this
requirement does not mean the creditor must prove the existence a
uniform set of standards used by the industry routinely." 0
Judge Posner then presented another difficult question: Which
industry should be identified when making the analysis?"' In Tolona
Pizza, the creditor supplied sausage to the debtor, Tolona Pizza, a
maker of pizza." 2 Judge Posner, in analyzing which industry was
at issue, asked whether he should look at "the sale of sausage to
105. Id. at 1032-33.
106. 957 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1992).
107. Logan, 957 F.2d at 243-44.
108. See, e.g., Bell Flavors & Fragances, Inc. v. Andrew (In re Loretto Winery,
Ltd.), 107 B.R. 707, 709 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); Branch v. Hill, Holliday, Connors,
Cosmopoulos, Inc. Advertising (In re Bank of New England Corp.), 165 B.R. 972,
979 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); Miller v. Perini Corp. (In re A.J. Lane & Co.), 164
B.R. 409, 413-17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
109. Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1031.
110. Id. at 1032-33.
111. Id. at 1033.
112. Id. at 1031.
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makers of pizza" or "the sale of sausages to anyone," or "the sale
of anything to the makers of pizza."" ' 3 In Tolona Pizza, the court
concluded that when analyzing the ordinary business terms requirement
the court should look at the practices followed by businesses similarly
situated to the creditor involved in the particular case.
1 4
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas in
In re Classic Drywall"5 described the analysis for the third element
as an objective test" 6 in which the court compares the preferential
payments with practices or standards prevailing in the industry."
7
The Sixth Circuit used the analysis from the In re Classic Drywall
case in determining whether the ordinary course of business exception
had been met in Logan v. Basic Distribution Corp. (In re Fred
Hawes Organization, Inc.)."' In Logan, the debtor was a small
electrical subcontractor and the creditor, Basic, was one of its trade
creditors." 9 The debtor bought electrical-construction materials and
supplies from Basic on an open account. 20 Similar to Tolona Pizza,
the court was presented with the issues of what industry and what
type of transactions should be used to determine ordinary business
terms.' 21 Basic argued that the court should compare the transactions
at issue with transactions Basic has with its other 1500 electrical
subcontractors. 122 The court followed In re Classic Drywall's approach,
however, and stated that "courts do not look only at the manner
in which one particular creditor interacted with other similarly situated
debtors, but rather analyze whether the particular transaction in
question comports with the standard conduct of business within the
industry.""3
G. The Eighth Circuit's View of Ordinary Course of Business-
Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking
In 1991, the Eighth Circuit decided the case of Lovett v. St.
Johnsbury Trucking (In re Transportation Systems International,
113. Id. at 1033.
114. Id.
115. Morris v. Kansas Drywall Supply Co. (In re Classic Drywall, Inc.), 121
B.R. 69 (D. Kan. 1990).
116. Id. at 75.
117. Id.
118. 957 F.2d 239, 246 (6th Cir. 1992)
119. Id. at 241.
120. Id.





Inc.), 124 a preferential transfer action involving the ordinary course
of business defense. The debtor in Lovett, Transportation Systems
International, Inc. (International), entered into an agreement with
St. Johnsbury Trucking (St. Johnsbury), a common carrier of freight,
to provide freight forwarding services. 25 Pursuant to the agreement,
International delivered freight to St. Johnsbury in the area that
International served and St. Johnsbury used International to deliver
freight in the same area. 26 The agreement resulted in a continuous
flow of reciprocal services and invoices between International and
St. Johnsbury. 27 International and St. Johnsbury operated under
this agreement for approximately twenty months, until an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy was filed against International.
2
1
During the twelve-month period before the involuntary petition
was filed, International and St. Johnsbury tendered each other checks
to cover their respective invoices pursuant to the written agreement. 
29
During the ninety-day preference period, International paid St.
Johnsbury close to $250,000.'30 Although the payment terms of the
agreement provided for payment within thirty days from the date
of the shipment, the payments were actually deposited by St. Johnsbury
an average of sixty-two days after the date of the shipment.'
After the order for relief was entered by the bankruptcy court,
the bankruptcy trustee filed an action to recover the $250,00 payments
from St. Johnsbury as preferential transfers. 3 2 St. Johnsbury asserted
the ordinary course of business defense.'33 The bankruptcy court in
Lovett found the payments were not protected by the ordinary course
of business exception and the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's finding.' 3 4 The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower courts'
decisions in Lovett.
35
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by quoting the statutory
requirements for the ordinary course of business exception found
in section 547(c)(2)(A)-(C).' 3 6 The parties did not dispute that the
124. 931 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1991).




129. Id. at 495-96.
130. Id. at 496.
131. Id. at 495-96.
132. Id. at 496.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 496-97.
135. Id. at 500.
136. Id. at 497; see also supra note 32.
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first element was satisfied, so the Eighth Circuit next reviewed the
bankruptcy court's decision regarding the second element-ordinary
course of business between the parties. 3 7 The Eighth Circuit held
that the bankruptcy court erred in basing its ordinary course of
business determination on the terms of the agreement between the
parties rather than on the actual pattern of conduct between the
parties.'38 The court stated that the determination of ordinary course
of business requires a "peculiarly factual" analysis'3 9 and the
"cornerstone of this element of a preference defense is that the
creditor needs [to] demonstrate some consistency with other business
transactions between the debtor and the creditor."'' 4
In analyzing the facts in Lovett, the Eighth Circuit held that
the focus should be on the timing of the payments. 4' If the timing
of the payments made during the ninety-day preference period are
found to be consistent with the timing of other payments made
between the parties, the creditor will meet its burden of proof for
the second element. 42 The court analyzed the payment history between
the parties for a twelve-month period and determined that the payments
made by International to St. Johnsbury were made according to the
ordinary course of business between the parties.
43
Of significance is the Eighth Circuit's treatment of the third
element-that the transfer be made according to ordinary business
terms. Neither of the lower courts specifically discussed the
requirements of the third element; however, the trustee argued on
appeal that St. Johnsbury did not meet its burden of proving the
third element.'"
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the trustee and stated that
the payments were made according to ordinary business terms "because
the manner, form, and timing of these payments were consistent
with the practice both parties followed previously." '' 45 The court
went on to state that "[t]o the extent, if any, that subsection (c)(2)(C)
137. Lovett, 931 F.2d at 497.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting In re Fulghum Constr. Corp., 872 F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir.
1989)).
140. Id. at 497-98 (quoting In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 B.R. 269, 272
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986)).
141. Id. at 498.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 498-99.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 499.
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requires comparison between the payment record of the particular
debtor and the general practice in the industry" St. Johnsbury met
this requirement by introducing the testimony of two officials stating
that late payments are common in the trucking industry.
146
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT IN IN RE U.S.A. INNS
The Eighth Circuit had an opportunity to revisit the issues raised
by the ordinary course of business defense in 1993 in Jones v. United
Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns, Inc.). 47 In In re U.S.A.
Inns, the Eighth Circuit clarified the requirements necessary to meet
the ordinary course of business exception of section 547(c)(2) 48 and
held that all three elements of section 547(c)(2) 4 9 must be met in
order for the ordinary course of business exception to apply. 50 The
Eighth Circuit also held that subsection 547(c)(2)(C), the third element,
requires an objective showing by the party asserting the ordinary
course of business defense that the transfer was made according to
ordinary business terms.'
A. Evidence of the Third Element Must be Introduced to Meet
the Ordinary Course of Business Exception
The Eighth Circuit held that the district court erred in its
interpretation of Lovett and stated that the Lovett decision left open
the question of whether the third element required specific evidence.
5 2
The Eighth Circuit noted that adopting the district court's
interpretation of Lovett would conflict with at least three other
circuit courts of appeals that have ruled on this same issue.1
5
1
The court adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit's opinion
in Logan v. Basic Distribution Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Organization,
146. Id.
147. 9 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993).
148. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 684-86.
149. See supra note 32.
150. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 684.
151. Id. at 685-86.
152. Id. at 685.
153. Id. at 684. See In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th
Cir. 1993); Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d
239, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1992); and WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
840 F.2d 996, 1010-11 (1st Cir. 1988). All three circuits held that the creditor must
introduce evidence to satisfy all three subsections of 547(c), including 547(c)(2)(C)
dealing with ordinary business terms. But see J.P. Fyfe, Inc. v. Bradco Supply
Corp., 891 F.2d 66, 69, 71 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989); Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In
re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1566(1lth Cir. 1986). Both cases discuss subsections
547(c)(2)(B) and (C), indicating that both elements may be met by the same evidence.
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Inc.),' 54 which held that Congress, by creating three separate
subsections in section 547(c)(2), must have intended to create three
separate requirements and to rule otherwise would render the third
element superfluous.'55 The Eighth Circuit concluded that all three
elements of the ordinary course of business exception must be satisfied
by the creditor.1
5 6
B. What Evidence is Necessary to Satisfy the Requirements of
the Third Element?
After determining that evidence of all three elements must be
met, the Eighth Circuit addressed the second issue-what evidence
is necessary to meet the creditor's burden of proving that the transfers
were made in accordance with ordinary business terms? The court
agreed with the interpretation of the Seventh Circuit in Tolona Pizza,
which found that although the third element requires proof of
conformity with some industry standard, the most important
consideration is the previous practices between the parties.'57 The
Eighth Circuit also adopted the analysis of the Sixth Circuit in
Logan, in which the Sixth Circuit held that subsection 547(c)(2)(C)
requires objective proof that the payment being considered is similar
to other payments made in the relevant industry.' In Tolona Pizza,
the Seventh Circuit found that the phrase "ordinary business terms"
refers to a range of terms that encompasses the practices between
similarly situated parties and only practices so "idiosyncratic" that
they fall outside this broad range are to be considered outside the
ordinary course of business.
59
The Eighth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's conclusion
finding that this view satisfies the legislative purpose of the ordinary
course of business exception to "discourage unusual action by either
154. Logan, 957 F.2d at 243.
155. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 684. The court in Logan stated that "Congress
clearly intended to establish separate, discrete, and independent requirements ...
[and] to hold otherwise would not only ignore the clear language of the statute,
but would effectively render subsections (B) and (C) superfluous to each other."
Logan, 957 F.2d at 244.
156. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 684-86.
157. Id.
158. Id. See also Logan, 957 F.2d at 244.
159. Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1033. The Seventh Circuit concluded that "'ordinary
business terms' refers to the range of terms that encompasses the practices in which
firms similar in some general way to the creditor in question engage, and that
only dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that broad range should be deemed
extraordinary and therefore outside the scope of subsection C." Id. See also In
re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 685.
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the debtor or his creditors during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy."' 160
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court's determination
that United Savings did not meet its burden of proving that the
preferential transfers were made in accordance with ordinary business
terms.' 6' The Eighth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court's findings
of fact de novo, but under the clearly erroneous standard,' 62 and
held that the bankruptcy court's findings were clearly erroneous.'
63
In applying an objective standard, the Eighth Circuit stated that
subsection (C) requires evidence of "a prevailing practice among
similarly situated members of the industry facing the same or similar
problems.' 64 Applying this test to the facts in this case, the Eighth
Circuit held that Benage's testimony' 65 regarding the general practice
of the savings and loan industry with troubled real estate loans
constituted sufficient evidence to meet the requirement of the third
element and held that United Savings had met its burden of proving
all the elements necessary to assert successfully the ordinary course
of business exception. 66
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HOLDING IN IN RE U.S.A. INNS
In re U.S.A. Inns is significant in that the Eighth Circuit took
a definitive position on a number of issues surrounding the ordinary
course of business exception. First, the Eighth Circuit resolved an
unanswered issue raised by Lovett and specifically held that all three
elements of section 547(c)(2) must be satisfied to assert successfully
the ordinary course of business defense. The Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of section 547(c)(2) is now consistent with the rulings
of the Sixth,1 67 Seventh,' 68 and First 169 Circuits.
Second, the Eighth Circuit adopted an objective standard for
determining ordinary business terms and explained this standard to
require courts to compare the transaction at issue with transactions
bteen s , ,,aILuat, m lu.I11 . .it I, tUth L y. T E11IgL
Circuit then compared the transactions at issue with practices among
160. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 685 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 373 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329).
161. Jones I, 151 B.R. at 491-92.
162. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 685.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Jones I, 151 B.R. at 492. See also supra part I.
166. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 685.
167. See Logan, 957 F.2d at 243.
168. See Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1032-33.
169. See In re WJM, 840 F.2d at 1011.
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similarly situated savings and loan associations and other delinquent
borrowers whose debts are secured by real estate. Therefore, the
Eighth Circuit indicated that the analysis for ordinary course of
business should be limited to transactions of a similar nature rather
than to industry practices as a whole. This ruling will require courts
bound by decisions of the Eighth Circuit to compare the transaction
between the debtor and creditor to transactions between that creditor
and other similarly situated delinquent accounts. 170
This ruling is also significant because the Eighth Circuit indicated
that the creditor's initial burden of proof may be met by minimal
evidence and if the trustee does not present controverting evidence,
the creditor will be found to have met its burden. Importantly, the
only evidence offered by United Savings was the testimony of its
president consisting of self-serving statements.' 7 ' As stated by the
bankruptcy court in Logan when discussing statements made by the
president of Basic, the creditor in Logan, "the court could not
expect Mr. Kerr's testimony, as president of Basic, to be any dif-
ferent." 172
Finally, this ruling also raises significant issues regarding ap-
pellate review. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court's
determination under a clearly erroneous standard. 7  Although the
Eighth Circuit described the tests for determining preferential transfer
actions as requiring a "peculiarly factual" analysis, 174 it reversed the
bankruptcy court's determination of a key witness's credibility.' 7
Therefore, In re U.S.A. Inns, may provide creditors a greater in-
170. The Eighth Circuit's test was rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Fin. (In re Meridith Hoffman Partners), 12 F.3d
1549, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit adopted the view that ordinary
business terms means "terms that are used in the usual or ordinary situtions." Id.
See also Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts:
When Being Delinquent is Ordinary: The Eighth Circuit Expands "The Ordinary
Course of Business Exception" Under Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,
27 UCC L.J. 208, 212 (1994).
171. Jones 1, 151 B.R. at 492.
172. Logan, 957 F.2d at 246 n.8.
173. In re U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 685.
174. Id. at 682-83 (quoting Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking (In re Transportation
Sys. Int'l, Inc.), 931 F.2d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1991)).
175. See Michael D. Benedict, Putting the Ordinary in the Ordinary Course of
Business Defense: In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs, Arkansas, Inc., Norton
Bankr. Law Adviser, Feb. 1994, at 6, 10 (stating that "the court while ostensibly
reviewing the bankruptcy court's findings under a clearly erroneous standard sub-
stituted its credibility determination for that of the bankruptcy court") "Certainly,
the Eighth Circuit provided no deference to the trier of fact on this 'peculiarly
factual' question." Id. at 10.
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centive to appeal adverse rulings by the bankruptcy court to seek
a complete de novo review of the evidence.1
7 6
Phyllis M. McKenzie
176. Id.
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